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Bank Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic Dynamics

Christensen, Ian; Meh, Césaire; Moran, Kevin - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2011

This paper assesses the merits of countercyclical bank balance sheet regulation for the stabilization of financial and economic cycles and examines its interaction with monetary policy. The framework used is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelwith banks and bank capital, in which bank...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391934

A Theory of Abuse of Authority in Hierarchies

Vafaï, Kouroche - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1999

This paper analyzes abuse of authority in a principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy under moral hazard. We characterize the optimal contracts when the supervisor takes advantage of his authority by blackmailing the agent. We show that the optimal policy for the principal is to deter abuse of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169018

Dynamic Prevention in Short Term Insurance Contracts

Boyer, M. Martin; Gobert, Karine - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

are not possible, the insured is faced with a commitment problem since he may want to renegotiate the contract or change …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100695

Sharing Liability Between Banks and Firms: The Case of Industrial Safety Risk

Boyer, Marcel; Porrini, Donatella - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2007

We characterize the distortions in environmental liability sharing between firms and banks that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. These distortions stem from three factors: the presence of moral hazard, the use of objective functions by firms and banks that differs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100710

Wealth Distribution, Entrepreneurship and Intertemporal Trade

Banerji, Sanjay; Long, Ngo Van - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

This paper examines the pattern of intertemporal trade between countries with different distribution of wealth. We also examine the consequences of redistribution policies in this framework. The driving force of our model are risk aversion, capital market imperfections, and costs associated with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100738

Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents

Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude; Helm, Carsten - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract which, due to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100739

Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-Agent Analysis

Fagart, Marie-Cécile; Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2002

This paper considers the information systems induced by auditing policies in a principal-agent model with moral hazard. We point out that two such information systems A and B are seldom comparable using the customary mean-preserving spread relation between their respective likelihood ratio...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100759

The Efficient Liability Sharing Factor For Environmental Disasters: Lessons For Optimal Insurance Regulation

Boyer, Marcel; Porrini, Donatella - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2008

Using a structural model of the interactions between governments, firms and insurance companies, we characterise the distortions in environmental liability sharing between firms and insurance companies that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. These distortions stem from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100766

Resistance is Futile: An Essay in Crime and Commitment

Boyer, M. Martin - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

a contract stipulating some transfer of funds from one player (say the agent) to the next (the principal) contingent on … separating contract exists. The optimal pooling contract can then be divided into two parts. For a proportion of Dares (x … inflicted to Dares convicted of a crime has no impact on the optimal contract. Investment in prevention is always beneficial if …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100773

Incentive Effects of Public Insurance Programs on the Occurence and the Composition of Workplace Injuries

Bolduc, Denis; Fortin, Bernard; Labrecque, France; … - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1997

This paper provides evidence that workers' compensation (WC) and unemployment insurance (UI)could affect not only the occurence of workplace accident claims, but also the composition of these reported accidents. Our theoretical framework predicts that, under plausible assumptions, an increase in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100890