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Overbidding in Independant Private-Values Auctions and Misperception of Probabilities

Armantier, Olivier; Treich, Nicolas - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2006

We conduct an experiment to test whether probability misperception may be a possible alternative to risk aversion to … explain overbidding in independent first-price private-values auctions. The experimental outcomes indicate that subjects …-down significantly overbidding. The structural estimation of different behavioral models suggests that i) subjects are heterogenous with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100674

Voluntary Contributions to Reduce Expected Public Losses

Keser, Claudia; Montmarquette, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2002

classical studies on voluntary contributions to public goods. The Nash equilibrium, under the assumption of risk neutrality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100545

Simultaneous Allocation of Bundled Goods Through Auctions: Assessing the Case for Joint Bidding

Rondeau, Daniel; Courty, Pascal; Doyon, Maurice - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2013

We use the experimental method to study the costs and benefits of allowing joint bidding in simultaneous multi-unit first price sealed bid auctions for bundled goods. The research has immediate applications to the sale of public forest stands that arbor a mixture of species. Joint bidding and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011184511

Incentive-Compatible Adjustments from the Anchor and Correlated Equilibrium / Ajustements depuis l'ancrage compatibles avec les incitations et équilibre corrélé

Dragicevic, Arnaud - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2010

In repeated-round auction mechanisms with endogenous market-clearing prices, i.e. when prices depend on submitted bids, the assumption of independent private values that underlines the property of incentive-compatibility is to be brought into question; even if these mechanisms provide active...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008565988

Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms / Evaluation privée d'un bien public dans trois mécanismes d'enchères

Dragicevic, Arnaud; Ettinger, David - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2010

We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms the BeckerDeGrootMarschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction, and the random nth-price auction in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the endowment effect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543323

Auction versus Dealership Markets

Bennouri, Moez - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2003

This paper compares two market structures, namely auction and dealership markets defined respectively as centralized order-driven and fragmented quote-driven markets. Our approach departs from previous works comparing these market mechanisms by considering both the timing of order submission...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169004

Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders

Lu, Hu; Robert, Jacques - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1997

We analyze optimal trading mechanisms in environments where each trader owns some units of a good to be traded and may be either a seller or a buyer, depending on the realization of privately observed valuations. First, the concept of virtual valuation is extended to ex ante unidentified...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100533

Snow Removal Auctions in Montreal: Costs, Informational Rents, and Procurement Management

Flambard, Véronique; Lasserre, Pierre; Mohnen, Pierre - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

Using nonparametric estimation techniques adapted from Guerre et al. [2000], we infer cost distributions and informational rents, from 666 snow removal contracts offered for tender by the City of Montreal. Our results are compatible with standard received theory of competitive auctions: there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101090

Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogeneous endowments and voluntary public-good provision

Keser, Claudia; Markstädter, Andreas; Schmidt, Martin - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2014

In a public-good experiment with heterogeneous endowments, we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed fair-share rule of equal contributions relative to one's endowment (Hofmeyr et al., 2007; Keser et al., 2014) may be influenced by minimum-contribution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183672

Informational Asymmetries in Laboratory Asset Markets with State-Dependent Fundamentals

Keser, Claudia; Markstädter, Andreas - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2014

We investigate the formation of market prices in a new experimental setting involving multi-period call-auction asset markets with state-dependent fundamentals. We are particularly interested in two informational aspects: (1) the role of traders who are informed about the true state and/or (2)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183675