We estimate a dynamic programming model of schooling decisions in which the degree of risk aversion can be inferred from schooling decisions. In our model, individuals are heterogeneous with respect to school and market abilities but homogeneous with respect to the degree of risk aversion. We...

We estimate a structural dynamic programming model of schooling decisions with unobserved heterogeneity in school ability and market ability on a sample taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). Both the instantaneous utility of attending school and the wage regression...

We estimate a structural dynamic programming model of schooling decisions and obtain individual specific estimates of the local (and average) returns to schooling as well as the returns to experience. Homogeneity of the returns to human capital is strongly rejected in favor of a discrete...

We estimate a finite mixture dynamic programming model of schooling decisions in which the log wage regression function is set in a random coefficient framework. The model allows for absolute and comparative advantages in the labor market and assumes that the population is composed of 8 unknown...

In a representative-agent model of intertemporal consumption-saving with stochastic income and habit formation, we have shown that precautionary savings observed in the data cannot be attributed only to income uncertainty, but also to the time-non-separability of preferences. We have found that,...

In this paper, we present the different cost sharing methods one can find in the economic literature. We regroup the methods into three sets : the proportional methods, the cooperative game theory methods and the serial cost sharing methods. All those methods are presented through the stylized...

It is important that the choice of a cost sharing method be made on the basis of its general equity and consistency properties rather than on the basis of the results it may generate in a given application. In this paper, we partition the different methods according to whether they satisfy a...

In this document, we present the notion of a cost game, defined as a cooperative game where the gain from cooperation is the cost reduction obtained when the projects of a set of agents are realized in a coordinated way. The problem is then to decide how this gain will be shared among agents or...

In this paper, we present the main solution concepts for cooperative games, which have been used in the context of cost games. We put a special emphasis on the concept of core. We also present the concepts of semicore, von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, nucleolus and Shapley value. However, we...