Subjects submitted strategies for playing a public good game. The strategies interacted with each other in a computer simulation. They could be revised and resubmitted for a second and a third simulation round. The strategies' average contribution to the public good increased from one simulation...

We alter who gets the last word on the outcome in three different types of trust games: the first mover, the second mover, or, a committee comprised of first and second movers. The committee functions in a manner similar to a peer review process, in which experienced subjects pass judgment on...

We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture....

In public goods experiments where subjects may change groups, we observe a continual flight of the more cooperative subjects away from the less cooperative ones. The less cooperative subjects attempt to enter cooperative groups in order to free-ride on their contributions. Lorsque les sujets...

In a public-good experiment with heterogeneous endowments, we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed fair-share rule of equal contributions relative to one's endowment (Hofmeyr et al., 2007; Keser et al., 2014) may be influenced by minimum-contribution...

We investigate the formation of market prices in a new experimental setting involving multi-period call-auction asset markets with state-dependent fundamentals. We are particularly interested in two informational aspects: (1) the role of traders who are informed about the true state and/or (2)...

Ce travail fait suite au rapport intitulé « Appels d'offres et enchères ouvertes : Enjeux de design et propositions » rédigé par Y. Richelle, J. Robert et R. Gérin-Lajoie qui, d'une part, met en évidence les problèmes liés à l'utilisation des procédures actuelles et, d'autre part,...

We present an experiment in which we test for the effect of participating in a social exchange exercise on revealed risk and ambiguity preferences. In our experiments, subjects make choices over lotteries that reveal their risk and ambiguity preferences. They then participate with a small group...

We experimentally test whether risk aversion or ambiguity aversion can explain decisions in a learning-by-doing game. We first measure subjects' preferences toward risk and ambiguity, and then use these measures to predict behavior in the game. We find that ambiguity averse subjects pay more...

This paper makes an attempt at testing the external validity of corruption experiments by moving from the lab in a developed country, to where it matters the most, the field in a developing country. In our experiment a candidate proposes a bribe to a grader in order to obtain a better grade. We...