The purpose of this paper is to offer a glimpse into the potential industrial organization of the property casualty insurance (P&C) market if banks continue to penetrate it at current rates. To do so, we study an insurance market where banks are already integral in distribution: Title insurance....

We provide an introductory review to the application of the theory of incentives under asymmetry of information to the exploitation and management of natural resources. We concentrate mostly on principalagent problems with adverse selection as posed by the regulation of nonrenewable resources,...

This paper reports on an experimental study of the influence of asymmetric information and information spillovers on bargaining outcomes. It develops and tests Kuhn and Gu (1999) s model of learning in sequential wage negotiations, by means of two Ultimatum Bargaining Games with uncertainty on...

We analyze optimal trading mechanisms in environments where each trader owns some units of a good to be traded and may be either a seller or a buyer, depending on the realization of privately observed valuations. First, the concept of virtual valuation is extended to ex ante unidentified...

Our objective in this paper is to illustrate and better understand the unavoidable arbitrage between incentives and flexibility in contexts of asymmetric information and to characterize the general features of an appropriate response to this challenge. We show that procedures and institutions in...

This paper studies the implications of non-commitment for organizational design. An organizational form must trade-off between the coordination benefits associated with the centralization of information and its associated costs in terms of renegotiation. This analysis makes precise what these...

In a theoretical model, we analyze the effects of various kinds of demand- and supply-side incentives in the context of a model in which patients and doctors must decide not only on an aggregate quantity of health services to use in treating various kinds of illness, but also have a choice...

Suppose an entrepreneur needs funds from a financier to invest in a risky project whose cost is fixed, and whose return may be high or low. Suppose also that the project's realized return is an information that is private to the entrepreneur. If the amount the entrepreneur pays back to the...

In existing papers on dynamic incentive contracts, the dynamic structure of the principal-agent relationship arises exclusively from the ability of the principal to learn about the hidden information over time. In this paper we deal with a different source of dynamics, which is considered...

The recent automobile liability insurance crisis in Atlantic Canada has prompted the four provincial legislations (Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island) to setup a task force to redesign, if necessary, the personal automobile insurance system. After...