Showing 1 - 10 of 14
We provide an introductory review to the application of the theory of incentives under asymmetry of information to the exploitation and management of natural resources. We concentrate mostly on principalagent problems with adverse selection as posed by the regulation of nonrenewable resources,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265863
We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterized version of the lemons' model (Akerlof 1970) in the insurance context predicts total crowding out of low-risks when insurers offer a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008560183
We ask whether young agents prefer to work in different-age or same-age production pairs in an overlapping-generations model where wages are reputation-based. We find that inter-generational teams (i) produce more heterogeneity in the old workers' reputations, (ii) generate a greater share of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100566
This paper studies a principal-agent relationship in a contractual crime setting. Suppose an agent and a principal sign a contract stipulating some transfer of funds from one player (say the agent) to the next (the principal) contingent on the state of the world announced by the first player. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100773
We analyze optimal trading mechanisms in environments where each trader owns some units of a good to be traded and may be either a seller or a buyer, depending on the realization of privately observed valuations. First, the concept of virtual valuation is extended to ex ante unidentified...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100533
Our objective in this paper is to illustrate and better understand the unavoidable arbitrage between incentives and flexibility in contexts of asymmetric information and to characterize the general features of an appropriate response to this challenge. We show that procedures and institutions in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100623
This paper studies the implications of non-commitment for organizational design. An organizational form must trade-off between the coordination benefits associated with the centralization of information and its associated costs in terms of renegotiation. This analysis makes precise what these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100644
In a theoretical model, we analyze the effects of various kinds of demand- and supply-side incentives in the context of a model in which patients and doctors must decide not only on an aggregate quantity of health services to use in treating various kinds of illness, but also have a choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100661
Suppose an entrepreneur needs funds from a financier to invest in a risky project whose cost is fixed, and whose return may be high or low. Suppose also that the project's realized return is an information that is private to the entrepreneur. If the amount the entrepreneur pays back to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100663
In existing papers on dynamic incentive contracts, the dynamic structure of the principal-agent relationship arises exclusively from the ability of the principal to learn about the hidden information over time. In this paper we deal with a different source of dynamics, which is considered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100758