We report experiments designed to test the theoretical possibility, first discovered by Shapley (1964), that in some …

the context of the effect of entry on firm selection in a Cournot setting. It is found that inefficient firms are more …

capacity units are costly, indivisible, durable, and big relative to market size, early entry cannot secure a first …-mover advantage, so that both firms are active beyond some level of market development. Once both firms hold capacity, tacit collusion … of market development play a crucial role in the determination of competitive behavior: we show that a tacit-collusion …

regarding future actions. While capacity units are costly, indivisible, durable, and large relative to market size, early entry … both firms hold capacity, tacit collusion, taking the form of postponed capacity investment, may occur as a MPE. Volatility … tacit collusion equilibria is favored by higher demand volatility, faster market growth, as well as by lower discount rate …

firm which can credibly commit to her location choice? Although entry deterrence is irrelevant here, our analysis shows … that entry blockading behavior emerges not only as the result of the incumbent's technological advantage but also as the … strategies. First, we show that the market center may be an entry blockading location under incomplete information for a high …

We elicit subjects' willingness to pay to reduce future risk. In our experiments, subjects are given a cash endowment … of uncertainty in our experiments. In two additional treatments, we control for future uncertainty with a continuation …

The role of field experiments in evaluating the effect of compensation policies on worker productivity is considered …. While field experiments solve endogeneity problems through randomization, they do so within a specific, and at times … unrestricted identification of incentive effects, experiments are better thought of as providing exogenous variation with which to …