We show that whether observing technological choices made by competitors is possible or not has significant impacts on the equilibrium technological configurations. Depending upon the industry characteristics, the strategic value of technological flexibility may be either positive or negative,...

We study the links between observability and flexible technological choices in a duopolistic market. We show that, in large markets, the strategic value of flexibility is positive and observability of technological choices promotes the adoption of more flexible technologies whereas in small...

We analyze duopolistic competition between horizontally differentiated firms selling durable goods or services subject to congestion. At each point of time, new customers buy one unit of the commodity from one of the firms, by comparing present prices and future congestion rates. We study the...

A model of location choice by Cournot oligopolists is presented, under the assumption that R&D spillovers depend on the distance between firms. We show that a variety of patterns emerge. Agglomeration is optimal under certain assumptions. Geographical dispersion in a two-dimensional plane is...

We derive corrective tax rules when firms are oligopolists whose production processes generate emissions that add to a stock of pollution that accumulates over time. In our model, firms play dynamic Cournot games among themselves, and the government designs a tax rule that corrects for both the...