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Systemic Risk in the Financial Industry: Mimetism for the Best and for the Worst

Warin, Thierry; Prasch, Robert E. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2013

perverse incentives and contracting arrangements, firms with oligopolistic power, the pricing and market advantages of being … information can itself be altered by the system's ""complexity,"" which in its extreme from can be described as ""opacity.""" …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183686

On the Use of Hierarchies to Complete Contracts when Players Have Limited Abilities

Boyer, M. Martin - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

Why do larger corporations have more layers in their hierarchy? My contention in this paper is that hierarchies arise because economic agents have limited ability to anticipate and ascertain every possible contingency they are faced with. As a result, the complete contract may become too complex...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100944

Compensation and Auditing with Correlated Information

Boyer, M. Martin; González, Patrick - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

An extensive academic literature exists on the optimal compensation of top executives. A less-developed literature pertains to the optimal compensation of middle management personnel. The goal of this paper is to address that concern. The setup we use is that of a firm s president (the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101028

The Study of Compensation Systems Through the Lens of Self-Determination Theory: Reconciling 35 Years of Debate

Forest, Jacques; Gagné, Marylène - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2011

Although compensation specialists generally argue for incentive systems that link rewards to performance, self-determination theory argues that such contingent rewards can have detrimental effects on autonomous motivation. The authors present a model of the motivational effects of compensation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009193025

L'Inspection des installations dangereuses; les expériences aux États-Unis et en France

Marcellis-Warin, Nathalie de; Peignier, Ingrid; … - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2003

credible so that the installations could see incentives to be in compliance with the regulation. Inspection is generally … carried out by the government who sets up the regulation. We have highlighted some economic incentives in order that the most …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100455

Male-Female Productivity Differentials: The Role of Ability and Incentives

Paarsch, Harry J.; Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

We consider the response to incentives as an explanation for productivity differences within a firm that paid its …: one due to differences in ability and the other due to differences in the response to incentives. We apply this … that individuals do react differently to incentives. However, while the women in our sample reacted slightly more to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100605

Ex Ante Incentives and Ex Post Flexibility

Boyer, Marcel; Robert, Jacques - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1996

Our objective in this paper is to illustrate and better understand the unavoidable arbitrage between incentives and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100623

Inequity Aversion in Tournament

Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2003

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100711

Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents

Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude; Helm, Carsten - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

We analyze a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract which, due to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100739

Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2003

be 20%. Since planting conditions potentially affect incentives, structural econometric methods are used to generalize …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100753