We examine how adaptation to climate change affects the incentives to ratify international environmental agreements (IEAs). In particular, we study the effects of two aspects on the incentives to join a coalition. First, we analyze cross-country differences in adaptation costs. Second, we...

We consider the effect of an increase in the risk from pollution. We show that in the case of a flow pollution, when the number of players is sufficiently large, the result of Bramoulle and Treich, showing that a marginal increase of risk in the neighborhood of a risk-free world is...

This paper presents a simple model of resource extraction where preferences are household's preferences depend on relative consumption levels. We identify two dimensions along which consumption externalities distort the efficient extraction of resources: (i) the static trade-off between...

This paper explores the effects of effluent regulatory activity on firm behavior in the pulp and paper industry in Ontario. The model uses instrumental variables to attempt to distinguish between that correlation between emission limits and emissions coming from regulatory capture and that...

We derive corrective tax rules when firms are oligopolists whose production processes generate emissions that add to a stock of pollution that accumulates over time. In our model, firms play dynamic Cournot games among themselves, and the government designs a tax rule that corrects for both the...

We analyze the contract-based relationship between a local community and a private operator in charge of a water utility. An important feature of the regulation model is the existence of water network losses that may reduce the operator's cost. We derive solutions to the optimal contract both...

In a stylized model of international trade, firms in the North indirectly export second-hand products to a representative firm in the South to be reused as intermediate goods, with potential trade gains. The level of reusability of waste products is a crucial choice variable in the North. This...

We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms the BeckerDeGrootMarschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction, and the random nth-price auction in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the endowment effect...

Jaffe and Palmer (1997) present three distinct variants of the so-called Porter Hypothesis. The weak version of the hypothesis posits that environmental regulation will stimulate certain kinds of environmental innovations. The narrow version of the hypothesis asserts that flexible environmental...

This paper re-examines environmental regulation, under the assumption that pollution abatement technologies and services are provided by an imperfectly competitive environment industry. It is shown that each regulatory instrument (emission taxes and quotas; design standards; and voluntary...