Subjects submitted strategies for playing a public good game. The strategies interacted with each other in a computer simulation. They could be revised and resubmitted for a second and a third simulation round. The strategies' average contribution to the public good increased from one simulation...

We develop a theoretical model in which each individual is, in some ultimate sense, motivated by purely egoistic satisfaction derived from the goods accruing to him, but there is an implicit social contract such that each performs duties for the others in a way that enhances the satisfaction of...

In public goods experiments where subjects may change groups, we observe a continual flight of the more cooperative subjects away from the less cooperative ones. The less cooperative subjects attempt to enter cooperative groups in order to free-ride on their contributions. Lorsque les sujets...

We show that the famous neutrality result in the theory of public good contributions (Warr, Kemp, Bergstrom, Blume and Varian) depends crucially on the assumption that agents do not take into account the effect of their public good contribution decisions on the relative price of the private...

In a series of experimental effort games each of two players may choose between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy to choose remuneration based on private effort, we frequently observe team...

We develop a model that accounts for the decay of the average contribution observed in experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good. The novel idea is that people's moral motivation is "weak"". Their judgment about the right contribution depends on observed contributions by group...

Transactions on online markets require a great deal of trust among anonymous trading partners. To mitigate some of the risks involved in anonymous transactions, several online market sites have implemented reputation management mechanisms that differ in structure and probably functionality. In a...