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How Did Ontario Pulp and Paper Producers Respond to Effluent Regulations, 1985-89?

Fearnley, Joan; Lanoie, Paul; Thomas, Mark - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1996

capital and on firms' water consumption, correlated with output. Estimation results suggest that total suspended solids (TSS …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100614

Efficiency Inducing Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists

Benchekroun, Hassan; Long, Ngo Van - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1997

We derive corrective tax rules when firms are oligopolists whose production processes generate emissions that add to a stock of pollution that accumulates over time. In our model, firms play dynamic Cournot games among themselves, and the government designs a tax rule that corrects for both the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100683

An Empirical Analysis of Water Supply Contracts

Garcia, Serge; Thomas, Alban - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2002

We analyze the contract-based relationship between a local community and a private operator in charge of a water … utility. An important feature of the regulation model is the existence of water network losses that may reduce the operator … French water utilities. We show that private operators can be allowed higher water loss rates as a way to reduce information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627158

Modeling the Choice Between Regulation and Liability in Terms of Social Welfare

Boyer, Marcel; Porrini, Donatella - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2002

Using a formal political economy model with incomplete information regarding the accident preventing activities chosen by the firm (moral hazard) under limited liability, we illustrate different conditions under which an environmental protection system based on extending liability to private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100693

Sharing Liability Between Banks and Firms: The Case of Industrial Safety Risk

Boyer, Marcel; Porrini, Donatella - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2007

We characterize the distortions in environmental liability sharing between firms and banks that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. These distortions stem from three factors: the presence of moral hazard, the use of objective functions by firms and banks that differs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100710

The Efficient Liability Sharing Factor For Environmental Disasters: Lessons For Optimal Insurance Regulation

Boyer, Marcel; Porrini, Donatella - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2008

Using a structural model of the interactions between governments, firms and insurance companies, we characterise the distortions in environmental liability sharing between firms and insurance companies that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. These distortions stem from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100766

The Paradox of Precaution

Barrieu, Pauline; Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2003

In the United States and most industrialized countries, regulatory policies and decision-making pertaining to food safety, occupational health and environmental protection are science-based. The actual pace and complexity of technological innovation, however, make it increasingly necessary to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100784

The Choice of Instruments for Environmental Policy: Liability or Regulation?

Boyer, Marcel; Porrini, Donatella - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2002

We address in this paper the problem of comparing and choosing among different policy instruments to implement the incentive objective of an efficient deterrence of environmental degradation and the remedy objective of an efficient clean-up of damages and a proper compensation of victims. Two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101101

The Impact of Court Errors on Liability Sharing and Safety Regulation for Environmental/Industrial Accidents

Boyer, Marcel; Porrini, Donatella - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2010

We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability between firms and financiers, as an environmental policy instrument. Using a structural model of the interactions between firms, financial institutions, governments and courts we show, through numerical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008753205

Organisation et réglementation des services publics d'eau potable et d'assainissement en France

Boyer, Marcel; Garcia, Serge - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2002

In this paper, we provide an analysis of the water sector in France. Together with a description of the specificities … of water delivery and the collection and treatment of waste waters, we highlight three crucial points to understand "the … French water school"": the organization of the sector, the public service nature of the activities and the regulation system …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005079418