Similar Search Results

Dynamic Prevention in Short Term Insurance Contracts

Boyer, M. Martin; Gobert, Karine - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

This paper looks at the dynamic properties of insurance contracts when insurers have better technology at preventing catastrophic losses than the insured. The prevention technology is owned by the insurers and is permanent. If long-term contracts are not possible, the insured is faced with a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100695

On the Use of Hierarchies to Complete Contracts when Players Have Limited Abilities

Boyer, M. Martin - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

Why do larger corporations have more layers in their hierarchy? My contention in this paper is that hierarchies arise because economic agents have limited ability to anticipate and ascertain every possible contingency they are faced with. As a result, the complete contract may become too complex...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100944

Inflation as a Strategic Response

Boyer, M. Martin; Léger, Pierre Thomas - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

In this paper, we examine the effect of increases in health care costs and general inflation on optimal insurance policies and waste in a model of imperfect information with costly auditing. We show that in such a setting, individuals will buy more than full insurance. Moreover, as the cost of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101018

Compensation and Auditing with Correlated Information

Boyer, M. Martin; González, Patrick - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

An extensive academic literature exists on the optimal compensation of top executives. A less-developed literature pertains to the optimal compensation of middle management personnel. The goal of this paper is to address that concern. The setup we use is that of a firm s president (the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101028

Organizational Design of R&D Activities

Ambec, Stefan; Poitevin, Michel - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

This paper addresses the question of whether R&D should be carried out by an independent research unit or be produced in-house by the firm marketing the innovation. We define two organizational structures. In an integrated structure, the firm that markets the innovation also carries out and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101033

Contracting under Ex Post Moral Hazard and Non-Commitment

Boyer, M. Martin - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

This paper characterizes the optimal insurance contract in an environment where an informed agent can misrepresent the state of the world to a principal who cannot credibly commit to an auditing strategy. Because the principal cannot commit, the optimal strategy of the agent is not to tell the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101113

Physicians' Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Dumont, Etienne; Fortin, Bernard; Jacquemet, Nicolas; … - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2008

We analyse how physicians respond to contractual changes and incentives within a multitasking environment. In 1999 the … on Quebec physicians to evaluate the impact of this change in incentives on their practice choices. We highlight the … clinical services and average time per clinical service. Our results show that, on average, the reform induced physicians who …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100959

Labour Supply, Work Effort and Contract Choice: Theory and Evidence on Physicians

Fortin, Bernard; Jacquemet, Nicolas; Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2010

model to data collected on specialist physicians working in the Province of Quebec (Canada). Our data set contains … period of policy reform under which physicians could choose between two compensation systems: the traditional fee …-for-service, under which physicians receive a fee for each service provided, and mixed remuneration, under which physicians receive a per …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008646904