Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria when the exporting country sets quantity rather than price. We consider two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by...

We model capacity-building investments in a homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth. Capacity building is achieved through the addition of production units that are durable and lumpy and whose cost is irreversible. While building their capacity over time, firms compete à la...

Local interactions refer to social and economic phenomena where individuals' choices are influenced by the choices of others who are `close' to them socially or geographically. This represents a fairly accurate picture of human experience. Furthermore, since local interactions imply particular...

Does a country strictly gain if it acts as a leader in a resource market under bilateral monopoly? Using differential games, we show that the answer is "yes"" when leadership can be exercised globally (global Stackelberg leadership), but possibly ""no"" when it is exercised only at each stage...

We develop a theoretical model in which each individual is, in some ultimate sense, motivated by purely egoistic satisfaction derived from the goods accruing to him, but there is an implicit social contract such that each performs duties for the others in a way that enhances the satisfaction of...

We consider the class of differential games with transition dynamics and constraints that are homogeneous of degree one. We show that if the integrand of the objective function is homogeneous of degree , then best replies to linear homogeneous Markov strategies are linear homogeneous, and the...

We show that, in a model with substitutability between capital and resources, the path of sustainable development may be non-smooth, and may exhibit the overshooting property: starting from low levels of capital and resources, the economy may accumulate capital beyond its steady-state level,...

We study the development of a duopoly industry -evolution of firm capacities and competitive behavior- in a continuous-time real-options model of capacity investment. Our methodology allows the evaluation of investment options and exercise rules in a strategic setup. In the initial industry...

We study a simple duopoly model of preemption with multiple investments and instantaneous Bertrand competition in a stochastically growing market. Different patterns of equilibria may arise, depending on the importance of the real option effect. If the average growth rate of the market is close...

We model the non-cooperative choice of levels of inputs whose current usage results in the future decline in their effectiveness. We show that there are multiple equilibria that are Pareto rankable. Compared with the social optimum, lack of cooperation implies excessive use of input, leading to...