In repeated-round auction mechanisms with endogenous market-clearing prices, i.e. when prices depend on submitted bids, the assumption of independent private values that underlines the property of incentive-compatibility is to be brought into question; even if these mechanisms provide active...

Agents face an ambiguous risk of biodiversity survival as well as ambiguous expected losses from its extinction. As a collectivity, agents are faced with the option of privately funding the protection of biodiversity for biomedical research. We propose two evolutionary models of threshold public...

Local interactions refer to social and economic phenomena where individuals' choices are influenced by the choices of others who are `close' to them socially or geographically. This represents a fairly accurate picture of human experience. Furthermore, since local interactions imply particular...

We report experiments designed to test the theoretical possibility, first discovered by Shapley (1964), that in some games learning fails to converge to any equilibrium, either in terms of marginal frequencies or of average play. Subjects played repeatedly in fixed pairings one of two 3 ´ 3...

We offer a definition of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) for games with (in)finite players, (non)compact strategy sets, and (dis)continuous payoff functions. IESDS is always a well-defined order independent procedure that can be used to solve Nash equilibrium in...

Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria when the exporting country sets quantity rather than price. We consider two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by...

We model capacity-building investments in a homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth. Capacity building is achieved through the addition of production units that are durable and lumpy and whose cost is irreversible. While building their capacity over time, firms compete à la...

Does a country strictly gain if it acts as a leader in a resource market under bilateral monopoly? Using differential games, we show that the answer is "yes"" when leadership can be exercised globally (global Stackelberg leadership), but possibly ""no"" when it is exercised only at each stage...

We develop a theoretical model in which each individual is, in some ultimate sense, motivated by purely egoistic satisfaction derived from the goods accruing to him, but there is an implicit social contract such that each performs duties for the others in a way that enhances the satisfaction of...

We consider the class of differential games with transition dynamics and constraints that are homogeneous of degree one. We show that if the integrand of the objective function is homogeneous of degree , then best replies to linear homogeneous Markov strategies are linear homogeneous, and the...