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Dynamic Prevention in Short Term Insurance Contracts

Boyer, M. Martin; Gobert, Karine - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

This paper looks at the dynamic properties of insurance contracts when insurers have better technology at preventing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100695

Bank Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic Dynamics

Christensen, Ian; Meh, Césaire; Moran, Kevin - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2011

This paper assesses the merits of countercyclical bank balance sheet regulation for the stabilization of financial and economic cycles and examines its interaction with monetary policy. The framework used is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelwith banks and bank capital, in which bank...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391934

Sharing Liability Between Banks and Firms: The Case of Industrial Safety Risk

Boyer, Marcel; Porrini, Donatella - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2007

We characterize the distortions in environmental liability sharing between firms and banks that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. These distortions stem from three factors: the presence of moral hazard, the use of objective functions by firms and banks that differs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100710

Wealth Distribution, Entrepreneurship and Intertemporal Trade

Banerji, Sanjay; Long, Ngo Van - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

This paper examines the pattern of intertemporal trade between countries with different distribution of wealth. We also examine the consequences of redistribution policies in this framework. The driving force of our model are risk aversion, capital market imperfections, and costs associated with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100738

Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents

Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude; Helm, Carsten - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

We analyze a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract which, due to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100739

Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-Agent Analysis

Fagart, Marie-Cécile; Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2002

This paper considers the information systems induced by auditing policies in a principal-agent model with moral hazard. We point out that two such information systems A and B are seldom comparable using the customary mean-preserving spread relation between their respective likelihood ratio...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100759

The Efficient Liability Sharing Factor For Environmental Disasters: Lessons For Optimal Insurance Regulation

Boyer, Marcel; Porrini, Donatella - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2008

Using a structural model of the interactions between governments, firms and insurance companies, we characterise the … distortions in environmental liability sharing between firms and insurance companies that the imperfect implementation of … industrial accidents. We derive policy implications regarding environmental disaster insurance policies. À l'aide d'un modèle …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100766

Resistance is Futile: An Essay in Crime and Commitment

Boyer, M. Martin - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

This paper studies a principal-agent relationship in a contractual crime setting. Suppose an agent and a principal sign a contract stipulating some transfer of funds from one player (say the agent) to the next (the principal) contingent on the state of the world announced by the first player. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100773

Incentive Effects of Public Insurance Programs on the Occurence and the Composition of Workplace Injuries

Bolduc, Denis; Fortin, Bernard; Labrecque, France; … - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1997

This paper provides evidence that workers' compensation (WC) and unemployment insurance (UI)could affect not only the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100890

Wealth Distribution, Moral Hazard, and Entrepreneurship

Banerji, Sanjay; Long, Ngo Van - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2000

This paper examines the endogenous determination of the choice between an entrepreneur and a pure lender. The model relies on three key factors: risk aversion, wealth distribution, and moral hazard. We show that, under certain assumptions, only agents in the middle range of the wealth...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101030