We study investment and consumption decisions in a dynamic game under learning. To that end, we present a model in which agents not only extract a resource for consumption, but also invest in technology to improve the future stock. At the same time, the agents learn about the stochastic process...

To isolate the impact of the assumption of model-consistent expectations, this paper proposes a baseline case in which households are individually rational, have full information and learn using forecast rules specified as in the minimum state variable representation of the economy. Applying...

As the workshop’s fourth session will concentrate on the subject of rules and regulations in organizations. In the context of global competition and the global crisis experienced by most countries all over the world, one of the question raised is how linking materiality with discourse,...

We introduce learning in a dynamic game of international pollution, with ecological uncertainty. We characterize and compare the feedback non-cooperative emissions strategies of players when the players do not know the distribution of ecological uncertainty but they gain information (learn)...

This paper reconsiders the theory of existence of efficient allocations and equilibria when consumption sets are unbounded below under the assumption that agents have incomplete preferences. Our model is motivated by an example in the theory of assets with short-selling where there is risk and...

The theory of existence of equilibrium with short-selling is reconsidered under risk and ambiguity modelled by risk averse variational preferences. No-arbitrage conditions are given in terms of risk adjusted priors. A sufficient condition for existence of efficient allocations is the overlapping...

The theory of existence of equilibrium with short-selling is reconsidered under risk and ambiguity modelled by risk averse variational preferences. A sufficient condition for existence of efficient allocations is that the relative interiors of the risk adjusted sets of expectations overlap. This...

We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful player in the neighborhood or play a best reply versus the opponent's previous action. From simulations it appears that each learning strategy will be used, because each performs...