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Compensation Policy and Worker Performance: Identifying Incentive Effects from Field Experiments

Shearer, Bruce - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2003

The role of field experiments in evaluating the effect of compensation policies on worker productivity is considered. Particular attention is paid to the ability of a field experiment to identify the effect of a permanent change in firm policy. While field experiments solve endogeneity problems...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005510347

The Response to Incentives and Contractual Efficiency: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Paarsch, Harry J.; Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2007

We investigate the efficiency of piece-rate contracts using data from a field experiment, conducted within a tree-planting firm. During the experiment, the piece rate paid to planters was exogenously increased. Regression methods yield an estimate of the elasticity of output with respect to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015322

Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious

Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2003

providing incentives through group versus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, either scheme may … incentives it generates when workers are envious. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696252

Inequity Aversion in Tournaments

Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2003

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268

Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Shearer, Bruce - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2003

Data from a field experiment conducted within a tree-planting firm are used to estimate the gain in productivity that is realized when workers are paid piece rates rather than fixed wages. The experiment provides daily observations on individual worker productivity under both piece rates and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696271

Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents

Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude; Helm, Carsten - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2004

We analyze a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract which, due to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696275

Male-Female Productivity Differentials: the Role of Ability and Incentives (revised)

Paarsch, Harry J.; Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2004

We consider the response to incentives as an explanation for productivity differences within a firm that paid its …: one due to differences in ability and the other due to differences in the response to incentives. We apply this … that individuals do react differently to incentives. However, while the women in our sample reacted slightly more to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696283