We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional...

The main contribution of the paper is to provide a weaker non-satiation assumption than the one commonly used in the literature to ensure the existence of competitive equilibrium. Our assumption allows for satiation points in the set of individually feasible consumptions, provided that the...

The stationary structure of the simple overlapping generations economies is used to try to extend to the case with extrinsic uncertainty the characterizations of their stationary equilibria by means of symmetrical multiple equilibria of a related exchange economy in which the representative...

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is...

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very...

In exchange economies where agents have private information, strategy-proof social choice functions defined on large domains of preferences, are not efficient. We provide a restricted domain of preferences, namely the set of generalized Leontief utility functions, where there exist mechanisms...

We study how asymmetric information affects market volatility in a linear setup where the outcome is determined by forecasts about this same outcome. The unique rational expectations equilibrium will be stable when it is the only rationalizable solution. It has been established in the literature...

This paper is concerned with multistage bidding models introduced by De Meyer and Moussa Saley (2002) to analyze the evolution of the price system at finance markets with asymmetric information. The zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information are considered modeling the bidding with...