In three related papers, we consider a pure exchange financial economy, where agents may observe private information signals, form private anticipations and face an "exogenous uncertainty", on the future state, and an "endogenous uncertainty", on the future prices. At a sequential equilibrium,...

In a financial economy with asymmetric information and incomplete markets, we study how agents, having no model of how equilibrium prices are determined, may still refine their information by eliminating sequentially "arbitrage state(s)", namely, the state (s) which would grant the agent an...

We consider a pure exchange financial economy, where agents observe private information signals, form private anticipations and face an "exogenous uncertainty" on the future state, and an "endogenous uncertainty", on the future prices. At a sequential equilibrium, all agents expect the "true"...

We consider a pure exchange economy, with incomplete financial markets, where agents face an "exogenous uncertainty", on the future state of nature and an "endogenous uncertainty", on the future price in each random state. Namely, every agents forms price anticipations on each spot market,...

We study how asymmetric information affects market volatility in a linear setup where the outcome is determined by forecasts about this same outcome. The unique rational expectations equilibrium will be stable when it is the only rationalizable solution. It has been established in the literature...

We consider a pure exchange financial economy, where rational agents, possibly asymmetrically informed, forecast prices privately and, therefore, face “exogenous uncertainty”, on the future state of nature, and “endogenous uncertainty” on future prices. At a sequential equilibrium, all...

We consider a pure exchange financial economy, where agents, possibly asymetrically informed, face an "exogenous uncertainty", on the future state of nature, and an "endogenous uncertainty", on the future price in each random state. Namely, every agent forms private price anticipations on every...

We extend the Cornet-de Boisdeffre (2002-2009) asymmetric information finite dimensional model to a more general setting, where agents may forecast prices with some private uncertainty. This new model drops both Radner's (1972-1979) classical, but restrictive, assumptions of rational...

We had proposed earlier a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets and asymmetric information, where agents forecasted prices privately without rational expectations. Consistently, they anticipated idiosyncratic sets of future prices and elected probability laws on these sets,...

We consider a pure exchange financial economy, where rational agents, possibly asymmetrically informed, forecast prices privately with no model of how they are determined. Therefore, agents face both ‘exogenous uncertainty’ on the future state of nature, and ‘endogenous uncertainty’ on...