Showing 1 - 10 of 17
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good when the timing of contributions is endogenously determined by contributors, focusing on the simple quasi-linear setting with two players (Varian, 1994). We show that the move order that is predicted to emerge is sensitive to how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552263
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)’s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010672348
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good when the timing of contributions is endogenously determined by contributors, focusing on the simple quasi-linear setting with two players (Varian, 1994). We show that the move order that is predicted to emerge is sensitive to how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051726
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)’s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677997
This paper investigates fundraising mechanisms for the private provision of a public good which utilize competition as an incentive device for contributions. Theory predicts that “all-pay” competition is particularly effective for fundraising. Within this class of mechanisms different types...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200590
This paper investigates mechanisms for the private provision of a public good which utilize competition to incentivize contributions. Theory predicts that “all-pay” competition is particularly effective for fundraising. Within this class of mechanisms different types of lotteries and all-pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150909
depends on the slope of the reaction function being zero at equilibrium. The application of this result to contests confirms … that in two-player contests the optimal delegation involves giving the agent incentives to maximize principal's payoff … while in contests with more than two players incentives will be different from principal's payoff maximization. Further …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150912
experimental rent-seeking contests. Although, as we show, existing evidence of excessive rent-seeking is in theory compatible with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552251
We report the results of laboratory experiments on rent-seeking contests with endogenous participation. Theory predicts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552252
This paper investigates mechanisms for the private provision of a public good which utilize competition to incentivize contributions. Theory predicts that “all-pay” competition is particularly effective for fundraising. Within this class of mechanisms different types of lotteries and all-pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552261