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ENDOGENOUS MOVE STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2009
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good when the timing of contributions is endogenously determined by contributors, focusing on the simple quasi-linear setting with two players (Varian, 1994). We show that the move order that is predicted to emerge is sensitive to how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051726
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ENDOGENOUS MOVE STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2009
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good when the timing of contributions is endogenously determined by contributors, focusing on the simple quasi-linear setting with two players (Varian, 1994). We show that the move order that is predicted to emerge is sensitive to how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552263
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ENDOGENOUS MOVE STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2010
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)’s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677997
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Endogenous Move Structure and Volunatary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment
Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2010
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)’s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010672348
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Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games
Fallucchi, Francesco; Renner, Elke; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2013
deterministic contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get feedback about own earnings, and … additional feedback about rivals’ choices and earnings raises average expenditures. In stochastic contests information feedback …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011154548
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Common Value Allocation Mechanisms with Private Information: Lotteries or Auctions?
Matros, Alexander; Possajennikov, Alex - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2014
We consider mechanisms for allocating a common-value prize between two players in an incomplete information setting. In this setting, each player receives an independent private signal about the prize value. The signals are from a discrete distribution and the value is increasing in both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123431
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Information Feedback and Contest Structure in Rent-Seeking Games
Fallucchi, Francesco; Renner, Elke; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2012
very different effects depending on the contest structure. We observe the highest rent dissipation in stochastic contests … when players only get feedback on own choices and earnings. In these contests aggregate expenditures usually exceed the …. In contrast, in deterministic contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576064
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The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking
Herrmann, Benedikt; Orzen, Henrik - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2008
experimental rent-seeking contests. Although, as we show, existing evidence of excessive rent-seeking is in theory compatible with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005796047
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Endogenous Entry in Contests
Morgan, John; Orzen, Henrik; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2008
We report the results of laboratory experiments on rent-seeking contests with endogenous participation. Theory predicts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005796055
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Fundraising through Competition: Evidence from the Lab
Orzen, Henrik - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2008
This paper investigates mechanisms for the private provision of a public good which utilize competition to incentivize contributions. Theory predicts that “all-pay” competition is particularly effective for fundraising. Within this class of mechanisms different types of lotteries and all-pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150909