We investigate the link between leadership, beliefs and pro-social behavior. This link is interesting because field evidence suggests that people’s behavior in domains like charitable giving, tax evasion, corporate culture and corruption is influenced by leaders (CEOs, politicians) and...

We experimentally investigate how different information about others’ individual contributions affects conditional cooperators’ willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual contributions is provided, contributions...

In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)’s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and...

This paper investigates mechanisms for the private provision of a public good which utilize competition to incentivize contributions. Theory predicts that “all-pay” competition is particularly effective for fundraising. Within this class of mechanisms different types of lotteries and all-pay...

We study a random effects censored regression model in the context of repeated games. Introducing a feedback variable into the model leads to violation of the strict exogeneity assumption, thus rendering the random effects estimator inconsistent. Using the example of contributions to a public...

In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good when the timing of contributions is endogenously determined by contributors, focusing on the simple quasi-linear setting with two players (Varian, 1994). We show that the move order that is predicted to emerge is sensitive to how...

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting. In one parameterization we find that overall provision is lower under sequential than simultaneous contributions, as predicted, but the distribution of contributions...

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than...

This paper investigates fundraising mechanisms for the private provision of a public good which utilize competition as an incentive device for contributions. Theory predicts that “all-pay” competition is particularly effective for fundraising. Within this class of mechanisms different types...

We study the interplay between leading-by-example and group identity in a public goods game experiment. A common identity between the leader and her followers is beneficial for cooperation: average contributions are more than 30% higher than in a treatment where no identity was induced. In two...