Showing 1 - 10 of 94
Most political and economic theorists point to moral hazard in teams as the main obstacle to lobbies' collective action. In this paper, we address this important issue with a coalition-formation game. In the process of doing so, we characterize equilibrium lobby structures both in the absence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884980
Most political and economic theorists point to moral hazard in teams as the main obstacle to lobbies' collective action. In this paper, we address this important issue with a coalition-formation game. In the process of doing so, we characterize equilibrium lobby structures both in the absence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005796050
size of the endogeneity bias in our model is very small compared to the size of the heterogeneity bias, which occurs when … individual heterogeneity is not accounted for in estimation of nonlinear models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552262
size of the endogeneity bias in our model is very small compared to the size of the heterogeneity bias, which occurs when … individual heterogeneity is not accounted for in estimation of nonlinear models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011860
heterogeneity with respect to two dimensions: capability and valuation. Our results reveal that with and without punishment … opportunities, heterogeneity crucially affects cooperation and coordination within groups. Compared to non-privileged groups … have on the other group members’ payoffs affecting individuals’ willingness to cooperate. Hence, whether heterogeneity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010601966
the variation in others' contributions, but with pronounced heterogeneity in individuals’ reactions. While the majority …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011154546
This paper reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players’ pre-reflective inclinations towards the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200580
Psychological game theory can provide a rational choice explanation of framing effects; frames influence beliefs, and beliefs influence motivations. We explain this point theoretically, and explore its empirical relevance experimentally. In a 2×2-factorial framing design of one-shot public good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200585
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper shows that the paradox has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200587
We replicate the experiment introduced by Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) measuring the level of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game. We collected data of 160 students from four different locations in urban and rural Russia. Like Fischbacher et al. we can classify about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200588