very different effects depending on the contest structure. We observe the highest rent dissipation in stochastic contests … when players only get feedback on own choices and earnings. In these contests aggregate expenditures usually exceed the …. In contrast, in deterministic contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get …

deterministic contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get feedback about own earnings, and … additional feedback about rivals’ choices and earnings raises average expenditures. In stochastic contests information feedback …

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that … conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that …

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that … conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that …

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical … prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is …

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical … prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is …

-pay competition mechanisms are then examined in a laboratory experiment vis-à-vis a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). All three …

in a laboratory experiment vis-à-vis a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). All four outperform the VCM and towards … the end of the experiment fully efficient outcomes are attained in the “lowest common denominator” scheme, which is …

While numerous experiments demonstrate how pro-sociality can influence economic decision-making, evidence on explicitly … experimental rent-seeking contests. Although, as we show, existing evidence of excessive rent-seeking is in theory compatible with …

We report the results of laboratory experiments on rent-seeking contests with endogenous participation. Theory predicts …