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Altruism or Artefact? A Note on Dictator Game Giving
Bardsley, Nicholas - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2005
Experimental dictator games have been used to explore unselfish behaviour. Evidence is presented here, however, that subjects’ generosity can be reversed by allowing them to take money from a partner. Dictator game giving therefore does not stem from orthodox social preferences. It can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005453726
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Altruism or Artefact? A Note on Dictator Game Giving
Bardsley, Nicholas - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2005
Experimental dictator games have been used to explore unselfish behaviour. Evidence is presented here, however, that subjects’ generosity can be reversed by allowing them to take money from a partner. Dictator game giving therefore does not stem from orthodox social preferences. It can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010601962
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Living in Two Neighborhoods – Social Interaction Effects in the Lab
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs; Gaechter, Simon - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2009
Field evidence suggests that people belonging to the same group often behave similarly, i.e., behavior exhibits social interaction effects. We conduct a laboratory experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field and allows us to study the behavioral logic of social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150913
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Living in Two Neighborhoods – Social Interaction Effects in the Lab
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs; Gaechter, Simon - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2009
Field evidence suggests that people belonging to the same group often behave similarly, i.e., behavior exhibits social interaction effects. We conduct a laboratory experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field and allows us to study the behavioral logic of social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552229
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The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence
Drouvelis, Michalis; Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain, a phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150918
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The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence
Drouvelis, Michalis; Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain, a phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150923
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Inducing Good Behavior: Bonuses versus Fines in Inspection Games
Nosenzo, Daniele; Offerman, Theo; Sefton, Martin; Veen, … - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2010
We examine the effectiveness of bonuses and fines in an ‘inspection game’ where an employer can learn the effort of a worker through costly inspection. Standard game theoretic analysis predicts that fines discourage shirking, whereas bonuses encourage shirking. In contrast, ownpayoff effects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010545647
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The roles of incentives and voluntary cooperation for contractual compliance
Gaechter, Simon; Kessler, Esther; Koenigstein, Manfred - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2011
Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self … gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit incentives affect cooperation. We first show that there is substantial … cooperation under non-incentive compatible contracts. Incentive-compatible contracts induce best-reply effort and crowd out any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010545657
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The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence
Drouvelis, Michalis; Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain, a phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552254
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Enlargement and the Balance of Power: an Experimental Study
Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin; Zhang, Ping - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2005
Many important decisions are taken according to weighted majority rule. Power indices predict that enlargement of the voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the existing voters may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005453699