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The Paradox of New Members in the Council of Ministers: A Noncooperative Approach
Montero, Maria - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper shows that the paradox has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200587
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The Paradox of New Members in the Council of Ministers: A Noncooperative Approach
Montero, Maria - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper shows that the paradox has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552237
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Proportional Payoffs in Majority Games
Montero, Maria - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2008
modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552275
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Proportional Payoffs in Majority Games
Montero, Maria - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2008
modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005453711
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Information Aggregation in Spatial Committee Games
Anesi, Vincent - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
This paper introduces information aggregation into the standard spatial committee game. We assume that committee members must agree on a decision rule to aggregate their private information on a policy-relevant state of the world. We derive sufficient conditions for the ex ante incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884978
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Information Aggregation in Spatial Committee Games
Anesi, Vincent - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
This paper introduces information aggregation into the standard spatial committee game. We assume that committee members must agree on a decision rule to aggregate their private information on a policy-relevant state of the world. We derive sucient conditions for the ex ante incentive compatible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200583
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Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games
Anesi, Vincent - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
This note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann- Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study Markov perfect equilibria of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following result emerges from such an exercise:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150911
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A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments
Anesi, Vincent - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2010
This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781905
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Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games
Anesi, Vincent - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
This note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann- Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study Markov perfect equilibria of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following result emerges from such an exercise:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010652415
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A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments
Anesi, Vincent - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2010
This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568152