This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <A href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11238-010-9196-5">'Theory and Decision'</A>, 2011, 71(2), 269-295.<P> Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in...</p></a>

This paper presents a unified framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects that depend on the rank-order of her decision...

See the article with the same title in the 'Economic Journal' (2003), 113, 598-614.<p> The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper...</p>

If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly...

This paper develops one possible argument why auctioning licenses to op-erate in an aftermarket may lead to higher prices in the aftermarket comparedto a more random allocation mechanism. Key ingredients in the argumentare differences in firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market...

We study auctions in which the number of potential bidders is large, such as in Internet auctions. With numerous bidders, the expected revenue and the optimal bid function in a first price auction result in complicated expressions, except for a few simple distribution function for the bidders'...

This discussion paper resulted in an article in the 'Journal of Industrial Economics' (2014). Volume 62, issue 3, pages 467-502.<P> Where markets are insufficiently competitive, governments can intervene by auctioninglicenses to operate or by forcing divestitures. The Dutch government has...</p>

This paper reviews the rice procurement operations of the Government of India from the standpoints of cost of procurement as well as effectiveness in supporting farmers' incomes. The two channels used for procuring rice are custom-milling of rice and levy. In the first, the government buys paddy...

In this paper, we provide a novel experimental auction design that exploits an exogenous variation in the probability of winning to test for the presence of expectations-based reference dependent preferences. We prove that (i) in this design, (which is a one parameter modification of a Becker-de...

We study antitrust enforcement that channels price-fixing incentives through setting fines and allocating resources to detection activities. Antitrust fines obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy...