Showing 1 - 7 of 7
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257415
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255768
This paper reports on experiments designed to compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods problems. One mechanism rewards and penalizes deviations from the average contribution of the other agents to the public good (tax-subsidy mechanism). Another mechanism allows agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135216
This paper analyzes the effect of reputation on ownership of public goods in the Besley and Ghatak (2001) model. We show that in the dynamic setup the optimal ownership depends not only on the relative valuations for the public good but also on technology (elasticity of investment). We also show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005577221
Besley and Ghatak (2001) show that public good should be owned by the agent who values the public good most — irrespective of technological factors. In this paper we relax their assumptions in a natural way by allowing the agents to be indispensable and show that relative valuations are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642170
experiment shows there is a workable alternative todeception. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256339
Why do people leave high-income countries with extensive welfare states? This article will examine what underlies the emigration intentions of native-born inhabitants of one industrialized country in particular: the Netherlands. To understand emigration from high-income countries we focus not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256776