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Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness

Iossa, Elisabetta; Martimort, David - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2014

In a public procurement setting, we discuss the desirability of completing contracts with state-contingent clauses providing for monetary compensations to the contractor when revenue shocks occur. Realized shocks are private information of the contractor and this creates agency costs of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261689

Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness

Iossa, Elisabetta; Martimort, David - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010789917

Division of Labour and Directed Production

Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2005

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135233

Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency

Burgess, Simon; Propper, Carol; Ratto, Marisa; Tominey, Emma - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2011

scheme of incentives in a major government agency. The incentive scheme was based on teams and covered quantity and quality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009370146

Task-specific effort costs and the trade-off between risk and efficiency

Ratto, Marisa - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2006

and incentives when the agent has a preference towards one of the two tasks. This is modelled by the assumption that the … have the same variance, the principal has to set different marginal incentives. This is because the agent tries to spread … optimal for the principal to set higher marginal incentives on the output measured with less precision. Hence the standard …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135212

Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency

Burgess, Simon; Propper, Carol; Ratto, Marisa; Tominey, Emma - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2004

scheme of incentives in a major government agency. The incentive scheme was based on teams and covered five different targets …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135249

Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for Teachers in England.

Atkinson, Adele; Burgess, Simon; Croxson, Bronwyn; … - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2004

This paper evaluates the impact of a performance-related pay scheme for teachers in England. Using teacher level data, matched with test scores and value-added, we test whether the introduction of a payment scheme based on pupil attainment increased teacher effort. Our evaluation design controls...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005577242

Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort

Schnedler, Wendelin - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2006

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077132

Efficiency in the Trust Game: an Experimental Study of Preplay Contracting

Bracht, Juergen; Feltovich, Nick - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2006

We use a human-subjects experiment to test the effects of a simple mechanism designed to increase cooperation and efficiency in the trust game. In the equilibrium of the standard trust game, the investor does not invest, foreseeing that the allocator would have kept all of the returns from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005022180

Nature of human capital, technology and ownership of public goods

Halonen, Maija - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2010

Besley and Ghatak (2001) show that public good should be owned by the agent who values the public good most — irrespective of technological factors. In this paper we relax their assumptions in a natural way by allowing the agents to be indispensable and show that relative valuations are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642170