We adapt the classical Schaefer model of fisheries management to take into account intergenerational equity, in the line of Sumaila ([18]) and Sumaila and Walters ([19]). The resulting discount rate then is non-constant, and the planner’s preferences are time inconsistent, so that optimal...

There is a general consensus that most subsidies to fisheries, particularly fuel subsidies, are harmful to both the economy and the environment. As the World Trade Organization struggles to come to an agreement on fisheries subsidies, understanding the position of the negotiating countries is...

We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs depend, while the non-informed player only observes his...

For zero-sum two-player continuous-time games with integral payoff and incomplete information on one side, the authors show that the optimal strategy of the informed player can be computed through an auxiliary optimization problem over some martingale measures. The authors also characterize the...

We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which the players have an asymmetric information on the random payoff. We prove that the game has a value and characterize this value in terms of dual viscosity solutions of some second order Hamilton-Jacobi equation.

The competitive equilibrium correspondence, which associates equilibrium prices of commodities and assets with allocations of endowments, identifies the preferences and beliefs of individuals under uncertainty; this is the case even if the asset market is incomplete.

We consider a problem of derivatives design under asymmetry of information: the principal sells a contingent claim to an agent, the type of whom he does not know. More precisely, the principal designs a contingent claim and prices it for each possible agent type, in such a way that each agent...

We are given a list of tasks Z and a population divided into several groups X j of equal size. Performing one task z requires constituting a team with exactly one member x j from every group. There is a cost (or reward) for participation: if type x j chooses task z, he receives p j (z);...