The paper proposes a notion of fairness which overcomes the conflict arising between efficiency and the absence of envy in economies with uncertainty and asymmetrically informed agents. We do it in general economies which include, as particular cases, the main differential information economies...

This paper studies the notion of fairness in pure exchange economies involving uncertainty and asymmetric information. We propose a new concept of coalitional fair allocation in order to solve the tension that may exist between efficiency and envy-freeness when the equity of allocations is...

An exchange economy with asymmetrically  informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that regulates  the information sharing among agents. For it, the notion of stable  sets à la Von Neumann and Morgenstern is analyzed. Two different  frameworks are taken into account as regards...

We use a mixed market model for analyzing economies with public projects in which the condition of perfect competition is violated. We discuss core-equivalence results in the general framework of non-Euclidean representation of the collective goods. We show that if large traders are similar to...

Two players are involved in a joint project during which a decision must be reached. Each player has private information about future profits. Authority gives one player the right to decide first in a pre-defined set of alternatives. In this framework, I show that (partial) authority should be...

We study a manufacturer-retailer relationship where, besides the adverse selection and moral hazard components, it is explicitly considered a type-dependent participation constraint capturing the shadow cost of exclusive dealings. The welfare effects of contracts based on both retail price and...