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During an English auction, bidders' behaviour conveys information on their valuation of the prize. So whenever … probability that a ring bidder wins the auction and reduces the price he pays. The presence of a ring harms other bidders (as well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839189
Calls for tenders are the natural devices to inform bidders, thus to enlarge the pool of potential participants. We exploit discontinuities generated by the Italian Law on tender’s publicity to identify the effect of enlarging the pool of potential participants on competition in public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802054
Allowing resale in multi-object auctions increases bidders. incentives to jointly reduce demand, because resale increases low-value bidders’ willingness to pay and reduces high-value bidders’ willingness to pay. Therefore (unlike in single-object auctions), resale may reduce the seller’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750345
The possibility of resale after an auction attracts speculators (i.e., bidders who have no use value for the objects on … sale). In a multi-object auction, a high-value bidder may strictly prefer to let a speculator win some of the objects and … then buy in the resale market, in order to keep the auction price low for the objects she wins in the auction. Therefore …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750373
A bidder is said to be advantaged if she has a higher expected valuation of the auction prize than her competitor. When … the prize has a common-value component, a bidder competing in an ascending auction against an advantaged competitor bids … the auction, and the presence of a bidder with a small advantage does not have a dramatic e¤ect on the seller.s revenue. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750392
. In an auction, the entrant pays a higher price to take over a target with higher synergies, because they impose stronger …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010800990
reduce auction efficiency. In contrast to what is usually argued, resale does not necessarily increase final efficiency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010801009
After an auction, a losing bidder can purchase the prize from the winner. We show why a strong bidder may prefer to … drop out of the auction before the price has reached her valuation, and acquire the prize in the aftermarket: a strong … common knowledge that, in equilibrium, a weak bidder will win the auction and, even without uncertainty about relative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005626752
We repeatedly elicited individuals? Willingness to Accept (WTA) evaluations for an auctioned bad in an experimental setting in which truthful revelation is the (weakly) dominant strategy. We investigate whether the observation of supposedly irrelevant signals (the market price, the asks at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011085407
We present a model in which issuers of asset backed securities choose to release coarse information to enhance the liquidity of their primary market, at the cost of reducing secondary market liquidity or even causing it to freeze. The degree of transparency is inefficiently low if the social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087538