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Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2001

If the private benefits of control are high and management owns a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies. There are two forces at play. First, managers effectively transform employees into a “poison pill’’ by signing generous long-term labor contracts and thereby...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802034

Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence

Ellul, Andrew; Pagano, Marco; Schivardi, Fabiano - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2014

countries, we find that family firms provide greater employment protection but less wage stability. Employment protection comes … protection afforded by family firms is greater, and the wage discount larger, the less generous the public unemployment insurance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010923394

Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent

Acharya, Viral; Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2012

We present a model where firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha") and managers are risk-averse. When managers cannot move across firms after being hired, employers learn about their talent, allocate them efficiently to projects and provide insurance to low-quality managers. When...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011262841

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment

Cespa, Giovanni; Cestone, Giacinta - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2007

When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with social activists may become … increased when explicit stakeholder protection is introduced so as to deprive incumbent CEOs of activists’ support. This finding … to stakeholder protection even in case of managerial replacement. Our theory also explains a recent trend whereby social …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802028

The Deep-Pocket Effect of Internal Capital Markets

Boutin, Xavier; Cestone, Giacinta; Fumagalli, Chiara; … - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2009

We provide evidence suggesting that incumbents’ access to group deep pockets has a negative impact on entry in product markets. Relying on a unique French data set on business groups, our paper presents three major findings. First, the amount of cash holdings owned by incumbent-affiliated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802031

Managerial Compensation, Regulation and Risk in Banks: Theory and Evidence from the Financial Crisis

Cerasi, Vittoria; Oliviero, Tommaso - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2014

This paper analyzes the relation between CEOs monetary incentives, financial regulation and risk in banks. We present a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects to be monitored by managers; managers are remunerated according to a pay-for-performance scheme and their effort is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106153

Banking Regulation, Institutional Framework and Capital Structure: International Evidence from Industry Data

González, Natalia Utrero - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2003

shown the influence of investor protection on financing decisions. We extend these measures of investor protection and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005626727

Law and Equity Markets: a Simple Model

Lombardo, Davide; Pagano, Marco - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF)

We analyze how the law and its enforcement affect equity market equilibrium. Improvements in the legal system, while invariably associated with broader equity markets, have different effects on equity returns depending on the institutional change considered and on the degree of international...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839176

Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development, and Politics

Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2005

This paper presents a political economy model where there is mutual feedback between investor protection and stock … market development. Better investor protection induces companies to issue more equity and thereby leads to a broader stock … market. In turn, equity issuance expands the shareholder base and increases support for shareholder protection. This feedback …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839186

Corporate Fraud, Governance and Auditing

Immordino, Giovanni; Pagano, Marco - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2008

We analyze corporate fraud in a model where managers have superior information but, due to private benefits from empire building, are biased against liquidation. This may induce them to misreport information and even bribe auditors when liquidation would be value-increasing. To restrain fraud,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839199