Similar Search Results

Information Sharing between Vertical Hierarchies

Pagnozzi, Marco; Piccolo, Salvatore - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2012

When do principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents? Information sharing affects contracting within competing organizations and induces agents’ strategies to be correlated through the distortions imposed by principals to obtain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011082498

Stable Sets for Asymmetric Information Economies

Graziano, Maria Gabriella; Meo, Claudia; Yannelis, … - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2013

the first one, it is shown that the set $V$ of all individually rational, Pareto optimal, symmetric allocations is the … unique stable set of symmetric allocations. For the second one, an example is presented which shows that the same set $V … belonging to the unique stable set is provided. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010801003

Information Sharing and Credit: Firm-Level Evidence from Transition Countries

Brown, Martin; Jappelli, Tullio; Pagano, Marco - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2007

We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, using a large sample of firm-level data. Our estimates show that information sharing is associated with improved availability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005626735

Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing

Bennardo, Alberto; Pagano, Marco; Piccolo, Salvatore - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2008

Multiple bank lending creates an incentive to overborrow and default. When creditor rights are poorly protected and collateral value is volatile, this incentive leads to rationing and non-competitive interest rates. If banks share information about past debts via credit reporting systems, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802027

Information Sharing in Credit Markets: A Survey

Jappelli, Tullio; Pagano, Marco - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2000

Information sharing about borrowers' characteristics and their indebtedness can have important effects on credit markets activity. First, it improves the banks' knowledge of applicants' characteristics and permits a more accurate prediction of their repayment probabilities. Second, it reduces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802055

Role and Effects of Credit Information Sharing

Jappelli, Tullio; Pagano, Marco - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2005

Information sharing about borrowers’ characteristics and their indebtedness can have important effects on credit markets activity. First, it improves the banks’ knowledge of applicants’ characteristics and permits a more accurate prediction of their repayment probabilities. Second, it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802068

Information Sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience

Jappelli, Tullio; Pagano, Marco - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2000

bureaus and central banks, on direct interviews and on official sources. The European experience highlights a set of important …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802099

Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence

Jappelli, Tullio; Pagano, Marco - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 1999

increase lending and reduce default rates. To test these predictions, we construct a new international data set on private …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750382

Exclusive Territories and Manufacturers’ Collusion

Piccolo, Salvatore; Reisinger, Markus - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2010

This paper highlights the rationale for exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction between competing supply chains. We show that with observable contracts exclusive territories have two countervailing effects on manufacturers' incentives to sustain tacit collusion. First, granting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008536095

Managerial Compensations and Information Sharing under Moral Hazard: Is Transparency Good?

Piccolo, Salvatore; Tarantino, Emanuele - Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) - 2011

We study the effects of information sharing on optimal contracting in a vertical hierarchies model with moral hazard and effort externalities. The paper has three main objectives. First, we determine and compare the equilibrium contracts with and without communication. We identify how each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009353570