We study the efficiency of the equilibrium price in a centralized, order-driven market where asymmetrically informed traders are active for several periods and can observe each other current and past orders, as in electronic systems of trading. We show that the more precise the information the...

We provide new empirical evidence concerning the contentious debate over the use of historical cost (HCA) versus mark-to-market (MTM) accounting in regulating financial institutions. These accounting rules, through their interactions with capital regulations, alter financial institutions’...

Fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good. Hence, the effects of its incorporation into stock prices depend on who is the agent controlling its flow. Similarly to a durable goods monopolist, a monopolistic analyst selling information intertemporally competes against...

In most economies, a fair allocation does not exist. Thus, it seems that we are condemned to live in an unfair world, since we are not happy with what we have and we look at the others with envious eyes. In this paper we want to give an hope for a more equitable society.

The paper proposes a notion of fairness which overcomes the conflict arising between efficiency and the absence of envy in economies with uncertainty and asymmetrically informed agents. We do it in general economies which include, as particular cases, the main differential information economies...

We provide international evidence on the relationship between the extent of underpricing related to initial public offerings (IPOs) and the distance of the issuing firm from the financial centre of a country: for France, Germany and Italy, the higher the distance, the higher the level of...

This paper studies the notion of fairness in pure exchange economies involving uncertainty and asymmetric information. We propose a new concept of coalitional fair allocation in order to solve the tension that may exist between efficiency and envy-freeness when the equity of allocations is...

We derive a set of optimal environmental regulations in the presence of asymmetric information about pollution abatement costs, where compliance may have to be induced through appropriate monitoring and enforcement measures. The regulator commits to monitoring of compliance with incentive...

We use data from the Italian manufacturing industry to document a positive relation- ship between delegation of decisions within organizations and involvement in research and development. This positive correlation is robust to controlling for the determi- nants of R&D within firms such as the...

How does the punishment for default affect repayment behavior? We use administrative data provided by the leading Italian lender of unsecured credit to the household sector to investigate the effect of two potentially important factors: judicial efficiency and the availability of informal credit...