A semi-empirical likelihood estimator is proposed for models where agents interact under asymmetric information. The methodology focuses on situations where some variables that were privately observed when choices were made become available to the econometrician afterwards. This variables are...

We model a situation in which the voters are or not fooled by the local or/and the federal government, and their capability of accounting the behavior of the governments, when they are not fully informed about which are services/goods that each level have to provide, and hence they are not able...

Policy towards speculative bubbles is examined in a model of a finite horizon 'greater fool' bubble, with rational agents, asymmetric information and short-sales constraints. This model permits the use of standard tools of comparative dynamics and welfare economics to analyze bubble policies....

The current debate on the new Basel Accord gives rise to a natural question about the appropriate form of capital regulation.We construct a simple framework to analyze this issue. In our model the risk carried by a bank as well as managerial risk preference are a bank's private information. We...

We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is...