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Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring

Franckx, Laurent - Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie … - 2001

This paper extends a previous analysis by Franckx (2001). We consider an inspection game between n polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in, on the one hand, imposing the maximal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005503920

Ambient inspections in environmental enforcement: an extension

Franckx, Laurent - Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie … - 2001

We consider an inspection game between an arbitrary number of polluting firms and an agency who can choose to monitor ambient pollution. We obtain an equilibrium where all firms comply with the same probability and where the inspection agency inspects all firms individually if ambient pollution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005503939

Optimal Monetary Policy rules for the Euro area in a DSGE framework

Ilbas, Pelin - Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie … - 2006

losses both under discretion and commitment. We compare the performance of unrestricted optimal rules to the performance of … optimal simple rules. The results indicate that there are considerable gains from commitment over discretion, probably due to … rate inertia does relatively well in approaching the performance of the unrestricted optimal rule derived under commitment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200735