We look at the impact of a binding minimum wage on labor market outcomes and welfare distributions in a partial equilibrium model of matching and bargaining in the presence of on-the-job search. We use two different specifications of the Nash bargaining problem. In one, firms engage in a...

Observational learning is typically examined when agents have precise information about their position in the sequence of play. We present a model in which agents are uncertain about their positions. Agents are allowed to have arbitrary ex-ante beliefs about their positions: they may observe...

We consider a model in which an informed Sender (S) makes an announcement con- cerning the quality of a project that an uninformed Receiver (R) can undertake or not. We study the role that reference dependence and loss aversion may play in affecting S? communication strategy and we show that...

In a market where sellers solicit certication to overcome adverse selection, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier is hump-shaped in his reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but sometimes repels low-quality sellers. As a consequence, reputational...

We present a partnership model where heterogeneous agents bargain over the gains from trade and search on the match. Frictions allow agents to extract higher rents from more productive partners, generating an endogenous preference for high types. More productive agents upgrade their partners...

This paper presents a model in which homogeneous rational agents choose between two competing technologies. Agents observe a private signal and a sample of other agents’ previous choices. The signal has both an idiosyncratic and an aggregate component of uncertainty. I derive the optimal...

Empirical evidence suggests that goods are highly heterogeneous with respect to the degree of price rigidity. We develop a DSGE model featuring heterogeneous nominal rigidities across two sectors to study the equilibrium determinacy and stability under adaptive learning for interest rate rules...

Intuition and leading equilibrium models are at odds with the empirical evidence that expected returns are weakly related to volatility at the market level. This paper proposes a closed-form general equilibrium model, which connects the investors’ expectations of fundamentals with those...

This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a sequential testing context. In every period the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal's decision. Neither the agent's effort nor the realizations of his signals are observable. First, we assume that the...

An urn-ball probabilistic model of the labour market is developed. Agents can be employed, (voluntary or involuntary) unemployed or entrepreneurs. The analytical long run equilibrium probabilities for each state and the matching function are derived. Then, the out-of-equilibrium dynamics are...