grain procurement, and positively to output price. …

Bidders in procurement auctions often face avoidable fixed costs. This can make bidding decisions complex and risky …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption … profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and …

model the procurement problem as a sealed-bid auction where the buyer has to allocate purchases between an expensive but …

asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of yielding an ex post efficient equilibrium without … have been ubiquitous in the study of (potentially) asymmetric English auctions. Therefore, my work highlights the economic …