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Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

We study a discrete-time model of repeated moral hazard without commitment. In every period, a principal finances a … the returns of a successful project unbeknownst the principal. The absence of commitment is reflected both in the solution … period to the next. We show that removing commitment from the equilibrium concept is relatively innocuous -- if the players …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011170126

Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission

Golosov, Mikhail; Skreta, Vasiliki; Tsyvinski, Aleh; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible. The gradual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009019140

Soft Budgets and Renegotiations in Public-Private Partnerships

Engel, Eduardo; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly used to provide infrastructure services. Even though PPPs have the potential to increase efficiency and improve resource allocation, contract renegotiations have been pervasive. We show that existing accounting standards allow governments to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004963476

The Basic Public Finance of Public-Private Partnerships

Engel, Eduardo; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been justified because they release public funds or save on distortionary taxes. However, the resources saved by a government that does not finance the upfront investment are offset by giving up future revenue flows to the concessionaire. If a PPP can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762742

Accessible Pareto-Improvements: Using Market Information to Reform Inefficiencies

Mandler, Michael - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

We study Pareto improvements whose implementation requires knowledge of only market prices and traded quantities, not utility and demand functions. Quantity stabilization gives agents the right to repeat the net trades they previously conducted, but requires policymakers to have records of those...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093933

Renegotiation without Holdup: Anticipating Spending and Infrastructure Concessions

Engel, Eduardo; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

Infrastructure concessions are frequently renegotiated after investments are sunk, resulting in better contractual terms for the franchise holders. This paper offers a political economy explanation for renegotiations that occur with no apparent holdup. We argue that they are used by political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093963

Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation

Engel, Eduardo; Fischer, Ronald - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

The government contracts with a foreign firm to extract a natural resource that requires an upfront investment and which faces price uncertainty. In states where profits are high, there is a likelihood of expropriation, which generates a social cost that increases with the expropriated value. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463877

What We Owe Our Children, They Their Children,...

Roemer, John E.; Veneziani, Roberto - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

Egalitarian theorists, since Rawls, have in the main advocated equalizing some objective measure of individual well-being, such as primary goods, functioning, or resources, rather than subjective welfare. This discussion, however, has assumed, implicitly, a static environment. By analyzing a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593530

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2014

We characterize the profit-maximizing mechanism for repeatedly selling a non-durable good in continuous time. The valuation of each agent is private information and changes over time. At the time of contracting every agent privately observes his initial type which influences the evolution of his...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933107

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939338

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