We review the theory of leverage developed in collateral equilibrium models with incomplete markets. We explain how leverage tends to boost asset prices, and create bubbles. We show how leverage can be endogenously determined in equilibrium, and how it depends on volatility. We describe the...

Efficient markets models assert that the price of each asset is equal to the optimal forecast of its ex-post or fundamental value. These models do not imply, however, that the covariance between two asset prices is given by the covariance between the ex-post values they respectively forecast:...

In previous work I have developed an equation explaining votes for president in the United States that seems to have a remarkable predictive ability. The purpose of this paper is to update this equation through the 1984 election and then use it to predict the 1988 election.

This paper reviews the theory and evidence concerning Political Business Cycles (PBC), which are based on the obvious facts of democratic life that voters care about the economy while politicians care about power. The first section provides an overview of different approaches to political...

This paper explores tests of the hypothesis that the tail thickness of a distribution is constant over time. Using Hill's conditional maximum likelihood estimator for the tail index of a distribution, tests of tail shape constancy are constructed that allow for an unknown breakpoint. The...

We show that very little is needed to create liquidity under-supply in equilibrium. Credit constraints on demand by themselves can cause an under-supply of liquidity, without the uncertainty, intermediation, asymmetric information or complicated international financial framework used in other...

We propose a model of rating agencies that is an application of global game theory in which heterogeneous investors act strategically. The model allows us to explore the impact of the introduction of a rating agency on financial markets. Our model suggests that the addition of the rating agency...

We provide a theory of pricing for emerging asset classes, like emerging markets, that are not yet mature enough to be attractive to the general public. Our model provides an explanation for the volatile access of emerging economies to international financial markets and for several stylized...

We define liquidity as the flexibility to move goods (money) from one project (investment) to another. We show that credit constraints on demand by themselves can cause an under-supply of liquidity, without the uncertainty, intermediation, asymmetric information or complicated international...

Financial innovations that change how promises are collateralized can affect investment, even in the absence of any change in fundamentals. In C-models, the ability to leverage an asset always generates over-investment compared to Arrow Debreu. The introduction of CDS always leads to...