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Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in an uncertain project, and their individual efforts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. The collaboration dwindles over time, but never ceases as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000297

Communication and Learning

Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning'' equilibria -- ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually …. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We …. In this case full learning equilibria exist. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593160

Experimentation in Markets

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1999

We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593440

Information and Volatility

Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the structure of private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938545

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939338

Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions

Bergemann, Dirk; Wambach, Achim - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly determines the allocation and the disclosure policy. A sequential disclosure rule is shown to implement an ascending price auction in which each losing bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939339

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255267

Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions

Bergemann, Dirk; Shi, Xianwen; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to privately bear the cost of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087410

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for all possible private information structures that the agents may have. Our characterization of these robust predictions relies on an epistemic result which establishes a relationship between the set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009322932

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325804

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