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Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

“Buy local” arrangements encourage members of a community or group to patronize one another rather than the external economy. They range from formal mechanisms such as local currencies to informal “I’ll buy from you if you buy from me” arrangements, and are often championed on social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196015

Efficient Recommender Systems

Bergemann, Dirk; Ozmen, Deran - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

We study the efficient allocation of buyers in the presence of recommender systems. A recommender system affects the market in two ways: (i) it creates value by reducing product uncertainty for the customers and hence (ii) its recommendations can be offered as add-ons, which generates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593236

Optimal Pricing with Recommender Systems

Bergemann, Dirk; Ozmen, Deran - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

We study optimal pricing in the presence of recommender systems. A recommender system affects the market in two ways: (i) it creates value by reducing product uncertainty for the customers and hence (ii) its recommendations can be offered as add-ons which generate informational externalities....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593425

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent’s actions are hidden, and the principal cannot commit to future actions. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645612

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost — the more lucrative is the agent’s stream of future rents following a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895676

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost—the more lucrative is the agent’s stream of future rents following a failure,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265334

An Economic Approach to the Psychology of Change: Amnesia, Inertia, and Impulsiveness

Hirshleifer, David; Welch, Ivo - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

This paper models how imperfect memory affects the optimal continuity of policies. We examine the choices of a player (individual or firm) who observes previous actions but cannot remember the rationale for these actions. In a stable environment, the player optimally responds to memory loss with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762485

On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs

Bernardo, Antonio E.; Welch, Ivo - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

This paper explains why seemingly irrational overconfident behavior can persist. Information aggregation is poor in groups in which most individuals herd. By ignoring the herd, the actions of overconfident individuals ("entrepreneurs") convey their private information. However, entrepreneurs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762537

Competing for Customers in a Social Network

Dubey, Pradeep; Garg, Rahul; Meyer, Bernard De - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

these situations as games in which firms compete for customers located in a "social network." Nash Equilibrium (NE) in pure … firms are blockaded at an NE, while the rest compete uniformly throughout the network. We also explore the relation between … underlying the social network. Finally we consider convex (instead of linear) cost functions for the firms. Here NE need not be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593259

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent's actions are hidden, and the principal, who makes the offers, cannot commit to future actions. We identify the unique Markovian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005064218