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Che, Yeon-Koo; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

This paper studies the design of a recommender system for organizing social learning on a product. To improve incentives for early experimentation, the optimal design trades off fully transparent social learning by over-recommending a product (or “spamming”) to a fraction of agents in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272683

Pundits and Quacks

Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

, and blindly follow analyst recommendations. As time goes by and recommendations accumulate, arbitrage based on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240393

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2014

We characterize the profit-maximizing mechanism for repeatedly selling a non-durable good in continuous time. The … valuation of each agent is private information and changes over time. At the time of contracting every agent privately observes … on the nature of the private information and the valuation process the distortion might increase or decrease over time. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933107

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939338

Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions

Bergemann, Dirk; Wambach, Achim - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly determines the allocation and the disclosure policy. A sequential disclosure rule is shown to implement an ascending price auction in which each losing bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939339

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255267

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325804

Career Concerns with Coarse Information

Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

one-time breakthrough. Effort levels at different times are strategic substitutes. Equilibrium effort (and, if marginal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009352220

Selling Information

Horner, Johannes; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We characterize optimal selling protocols/equilibria of a game in which an Agent first puts hidden effort to acquire information and then transacts with a Firm that uses this information to take a decision. We determine the equilibrium payoffs that maximize incentives to acquire information. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643465

Competitive Experimentation with Private Information

Moscarini, Guiseppe; Squintani, Francesco - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004

We study a winner-take-all R&D race where firms are privately informed about the uncertain arrival rate of the invention. Due to the interdependent-value nature of the problem, the equilibrium displays a strong herding effect that distinguishes our framework from war-of-attrition models....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762746

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