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Pundits and Quacks
Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015
, and blindly follow analyst recommendations. As time goes by and recommendations accumulate, arbitrage based on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240393
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Optimal Design for Social Learning
Che, Yeon-Koo; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015
This paper studies the design of a recommender system for organizing social learning on a product. To improve … incentives for early experimentation, the optimal design trades off fully transparent social learning by over-recommending a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272683
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Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission
Golosov, Mikhail; Skreta, Vasiliki; Tsyvinski, Aleh; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011
This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible. The gradual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009019140
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Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach
Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2014
We characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanism for time separable allocation problems in continuous time. The … valuation of each agent is private information and changes over time. At the time of contracting every agent privately observes … depending on the nature of the private information the distortion might increase or decrease over time. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011124283
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The Limits of Price Discrimination
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Benjamin; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers' tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out "third degree price discrimination." We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189002
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Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may or may not have access to more private information is characterized and shown to be equivalent to the set of an incomplete information version of correlated equilibrium, which we call...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817214
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The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is characterized and shown to be equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817228
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The Limits of Price Discrimination
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Benjamin; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers' tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out "third degree price discrimination." We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895634
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Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach
Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2014
We characterize the profit-maximizing mechanism for repeatedly selling a non-durable good in continuous time. The … valuation of each agent is private information and changes over time. At the time of contracting every agent privately observes …/geometric Brownian motion, Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, or is derived from a Bayesian learning model are discussed. We show that depending …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895641
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The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
We define and characterize a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium: The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895650