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Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing

Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

We analyze the canonical nonlinear pricing model with limited information. A seller offers a menu with a finite number of choices to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. By revealing an underlying connection to quantization theory, we derive the optimal finite menu for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752834

Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

We analyze nonlinear pricing with finite information. A seller offers a menu to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. The menu is limited to offering a finite number of choices representing a finite communication capacity between buyer and seller. We identify necessary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011124281

Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012

We analyze a nonlinear pricing model with limited information. Each buyer can purchase a large variety, d, of goods. His preference for each good is represented by a scalar and his preference over d goods is represented by a d-dimensional vector. The type space of each buyer is given by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895638

Investment and Competitive Matching

Noldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2014

inefficiencies that we can interpret as coordination failures. All allocations satisfying a constrained efficiency property are … notably, quasiconcave utilities) for the investments of matched agents to satisfy an exchange efficiency property as well as … conditions then forming the core of sufficient conditions for the efficiency of equilibrium allocations. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942841

Uniform Asymptotic Normality in Stationary and Unit Root Autoregression

Han, Chirok; Phillips, Peter C.B.; Sul, Donggyu - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

While differencing transformations can eliminate nonstationarity, they typically reduce signal strength and correspondingly reduce rates of convergence in unit root autoregressions. The present paper shows that aggregating moment conditions that are formulated in differences provides an orderly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008493454

The Virtues and Vices of Equilibrium and the Future of Financial Economics

Farmer, J. Doyne; Geanakoplos, John - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

The use of equilibrium models in economics springs from the desire for parsimonious models of economic phenomena that take human reasoning into account. This approach has been the cornerstone of modern economic theory. We explain why this is so, extolling the virtues of equilibrium theory; then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976721

More Efficient Kernel Estimation in Nonparametric Regression with Autocorrelated Errors

Xiao, Zhijie; Linton, Oliver; Carroll, Raymond J.; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2002

We propose a modification of kernel time series regression estimators that improves efficiency when the innovation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196009

An Economy with Personal Currency: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Angerer, Martin; Huber, Juergen; Shubik, Martin; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

Is personal currency issued by participants sufficient to operate an economy efficiently, with no outside or government money? Sahi and Yao (1989) and Sorin (1996) constructed a strategic market game to prove that this is possible. We conduct an experimental game in which each agent issues her...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463900

An Optimal Fair Job Assignment Problem

Yang, Zaifu - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2002

We study the problem of how to allocate a set of indivisible objects like jobs or houses and an amount of money among a group of people as fairly and as efficiently as possible. A particular constraint for such an allocation is that every person should be assigned with the same number of objects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593278

First Difference MLE and Dynamic Panel Estimation

Han, Chirok; Phillips, Peter C.B. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

First difference maximum likelihood (FDML) seems an attractive estimation methodology in dynamic panel data modeling because differencing eliminates fixed effects and, in the case of a unit root, differencing transforms the data to stationarity, thereby addressing both incidental parameter...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790281