What determines how trade in a commodity is divided between privately negotiated transactions via "middle men" (dealer/brokers) in a telephone or "dealer market" versus transactions via "market makers" (specialists) at publicly observable bid/ask prices? To address this question, we extend...

Firms make investments in technology to increase productivity. But in emerging markets, where a culture of informality is widespread, information technology (IT) investments leading to greater transparency can impose a cost through higher taxes and need for regulatory compliance. This tendency...

Despite evidence that consumers search across both stores (spatial) and time (temporal), the search literature models search in only one dimension. We develop a model of spatiotemporal search that nests a finite horizon model of spatial search within an infinite horizon model of inter-temporal...

The organization of supply relations varies across industries. This paper builds a theoretical framework to compare three alternative supply structures: vertical integration, networks, and markets. The analysis considers the relationship between uncertainty in demand for specific inputs,...

We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium directly from Nash's theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games. Instead we use a variant of the Shapley-Shubik trading-post game.

Extreme adverse selection arises when private information has unbounded support, and market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibrium outcome. We study extreme adverse selection via the limit behavior of a financial market as the support of private information converges to an...

The organization of supply relations varies across industries. This paper builds a theoretical framework to compare three alternative supply structures: vertical integration, networks, and markets. The analysis considers the relationship between uncertainty in demand for specific inputs,...

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is...

In order to explain in a systematic way why certain combinations of market, financial, and legal structures may be intrinsic to certain capabilities to exchange real goods, we introduce criteria for abstracting the qualitative functions of markets. The criteria involve the number of strategic...

This paper provides a model of firm and industry dynamics that allows for entry, exit and firm-specific uncertainty generating variability in the fortunes of firms. It focuses on the impact of uncertainty arising from investment in research and exploration-type processes. It analyzes the...