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are no transaction costs, the outcome of this matching and bargaining game should be the unique competitive equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593559
This paper solves for the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party … equilibrium payoffs. Our results shed light on the role of different forms of commitment on the bargaining process. In particular …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011075769
observing a given offer. We further characterize the equilibrium payoffs that can be achieved in the bargaining game in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008456248
Different markets are cleared by different types of prices -- seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009221543
Different markets are cleared by different types of prices -- a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We introduce the notion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545756
In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the structure of private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938545
The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939338
We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly determines the allocation and the disclosure policy. A sequential disclosure rule is shown to implement an ascending price auction in which each losing bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939339
A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255267
We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to privately bear the cost of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087410