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Short Run Needs and Long Term Goals: A Dynamic Model of Thirst Management

Huang, Guofang; Khwaja, Ahmed; Sudhir, K. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012

Beverage consumption occurs many times a day in response to a variety of needs that change throughout the day. In making their choices, consumers self-regulate their consumption by managing short run needs (e.g., hydration and mood pickup) with long-term goals (e.g., health). Using unique...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010578247

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent’s actions are hidden, and the principal cannot commit to future actions. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645612

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost — the more lucrative is the agent’s stream of future rents following a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895676

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost—the more lucrative is the agent’s stream of future rents following a failure,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265334

Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining

Rozen, Kareen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

both coalition partners and the potentially generated resource. We prove that group learning leads with probability one to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979388

Collaborating

Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in an uncertain project, and their individual efforts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. The collaboration dwindles over time, but never ceases as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000297

Wald Revisited: The Optimal Level of Experimentation

Moscarini, Giuseppe; Smith, Lones - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1998

This paper revisits Wald's (1947) sequential experimentation paradigm, now assuming that an impatient decision maker can run variable-size experiments each period at some increasing and strictly convex cost before finally choosing an irreversible action. We translate this natural discrete time...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762616

Communication and Learning

Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning'' equilibria -- ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually …. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We …. In this case full learning equilibria exist. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593160

Experimentation in Markets

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1999

We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593440

Market Diffusion with Two-Sided Learning

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996

The diffusion of a new product of uncertain value is analyzed in a duopolistic market in continuous time. The two sides of the market, buyers and sellers, learn the true value of the new product over time as a result of experimentation. Buyers have heterogeneous preferences over the products and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463873