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The Implementation Duality
Noldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015
underlying implementation duality. We show how this duality can be used to obtain a sharpening of the taxation principle, to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201348
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Identification and Estimation in Two-Sided Matching Markets
Agarwal, Nikhil; Diamond, William - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
We study estimation and non-parametric identification of preferences in two-sided matching markets using data from a single market with many agents. We consider a model in which preferences of each side of the market are vertical, utility is non-transferable and the observed matches are pairwise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895674
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Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing
Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010
We analyze the canonical nonlinear pricing model with limited information. A seller offers a menu with a finite number of choices to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. By revealing an underlying connection to quantization theory, we derive the optimal finite menu for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752834
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Dynamic Moral Hazard without Commitment
Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015
We study a discrete-time model of repeated moral hazard without commitment. In every period, a principal finances a project, choosing the scale of the project and a contingent payment plan for an agent, who has the opportunity to appropriate the returns of a successful project unbeknownst the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011170126
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Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations
Deb, Joyee; Li, Jin; Mukherjee, Arijit - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015
We study optimal contracting in a setting where a firm repeatedly interacts with multiple workers, and can compensate them based on publicly available performance signals as well as privately reported peer evaluations. If the evaluation and the effort provision are done by different workers (as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210467
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The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade
Gerardi, Dino; Horner, Johannes; Maestri, Lucas - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010
This paper solves for the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers, as discounting vanishes. The seller of a good is informed of its quality, which affects both his cost and the buyer's valuation, but the buyer is not. To...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011075769
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The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade
Gerardi, Dino; Horner, Johannes; Maestri, Lucas - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010
We examine the buyer-seller problem under different levels of commitment. The seller is informed of the quality of the good, which affects both his cost and the buyer’s valuation, but the buyer is not. We characterize the allocations that can be achieved through mechanisms in which, unlike...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008456248
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Rationalizable Implementation
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Tercieux, Olivier - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008476247
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Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008
robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost … sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post … implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545755
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Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005
assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity … (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost … sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. It requires that there not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593322