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Managerial Incentives and Capital Management

Holmstrom, Bengt; Ricard, I.; Costa, Joan - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1984

In Holmstrom (1982) an example is given, which shows that a manager's concern for the value of his human capital will lead to a natural incongruity in risk-preferences between himself and the owners, even when no effort considerations are involved. In this paper we present a formal model of this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249295

Grading in Games of Status: Marking Exams and Setting Wages

Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005

incentives to work are changed. We first apply games of status to grading exams. Our main conclusion is that if students care … are disparate, the optimal wage schedule creates different grades than we found with status incentives alone. The very top … status grades are optimal as we found with status incentives alone. A bonus is paid only to scores in the top status grade. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087371

Grading Exams: 100, 99, 98,...or A, B, C?

Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

. Utilities depend on the ranking of all the scores. By clustering scores into grades, the ranking is coarsened, and the incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016203

Grading Exams: 100, 99, ..., 1 or A, B, C? Incentives in Games of Status

Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004

We show that if students care primarily about their status (relative rank) in class, they are best motivated to work not by revealing their exact numerical exam scores (100,99,...,1), but instead by clumping them in broad categories (A,B,C). If their abilities are disparate, the optimal grading...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762518

Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships

Pearce, David G.; Abreu, Dilip; Milgrom, Paul R. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1988

improves incentives for cooperation, the other two changes can have the reverse effect. When the game is specified in the … length can be to destroy all incentives for cooperation, reversing the usual conclusion associated with the Folk Theorem for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762644

Grading in Games of Status: Marking Exams and Setting Wages

Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762795

Warranties, Durability, and Maintenance: Two Sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model

Lutz, Nancy A.; Dybvig, Philip H. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1989

We consider the provision of an optimal warranty in a continuous-time model with two-sided moral hazard. The optimal warranty must balance the producer's durability incentive and the buyer's maintenance incentive. Too little warranty protection gives the producer too much incentive to produce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196051

Shiller, Robert J.; Boycko, Maxim; Korobov, Vladimir - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1990

incentives for hard work, and in their understanding of the workings of markets. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634715

Games with Money and Status: How Best to Incentivize Work

Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2014

Status is greatly valued in the real world, yet it has not received much attention from economic theorists. We examine how the owner of a firm can best combine money and status together to get his employees to work hard for the least total cost. We find that he should motivate workers of low...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895679

Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision

Ederer, Florian; Holden, Richard; Meyer, Margaret - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2014

It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superior knowledge of the environment, and that deliberate lack of transparency about the incentive scheme can reduce gaming. We formally investigate these arguments in a two-task moral hazard model in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895687